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Abstract 
 In this research, we propose  an  anonymous authentication e-health 
system  and  the  use of  RFID smart card that contained  hidden  patient's  
personal identity,  so the privacy of  doctors and  patients could  improved  
optimally (for  example,  by hiding their identity). We employ Camenisch-
Lysyanskaya Signature Scheme to achieve anonymity and Java programming 
for constructing our anonymous authentication e-health system. The results 
showed  that the system  that  made  have been able to protect  the  personal 
data of  patient and doctor.  For anonymous process, prover  needs more time 
than  the  verifier, this happens because in  the  CL scheme, proof  of  
knowledge is a combination of CL  signatures with evidentiary  value of the 
commit inside the CL signature  value.   Computational  time that  required  
for the authentication process with  the smart card  until accepted by  the e-
health  system takes 0.6 s. 
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Introduction 
Nowaday  e-ID  technology has developed rapidly, and widely applied 
in daily life - days. One of the real technology of e-ID is a Radio-Frequency 
Identification (RFID), that  often used in the  e-health services for a variety 
of cases,  among others, patient safety and medication management (kou-hui 
et al., 2013), ubiquitous healthcare systems (Kreps and Neuhauser, 2010), 
inpatient-care systems [Krummenacher et.al, 2007], autotracking clinical 
interventions, and electronic-health records. All of these applications 
promise patient, nurse, doctor, and administrator to efficiently access 
relevant health information, enhance the quality of patient care, reduce 
healthcare errors, increase collaboration, and encourage the adoption of 
European Scientific Journal   September  2014 edition vol.10, No.27   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
96 
healthy behaviors. E-ID basically contains information about the attributes of 
client, such as name, address, gender, occupation, place and date of birth, 
and so on. This information in a commercial case is very important and can 
be used in an  authentication system based on client's attribute (Guo et al, 
2012). 
 One of the serious issues in the systems of e-ID is related to the 
privacy of user information. Most of the e-ID system is leaking the privacy 
of information that is held by the user. Service providers can freely obtain, 
collect and store all information relating to each user when user  access the  
services. One solution that can be used to overcome the leakage of the user 
information is anonymous credential systems(kou-hui et al., 2013). 
 In this paper, we focus on RFID technology integrated with the 
process consulting to doctor. In particular, the issues of performance 
efficiency, system security, and patient privacy will be thoroughly 
investigated. This system will be integrated with the database on the web 
server. Electronic patient identity using RFID, that contains the patient's 
signature  to consult a doctor. The use of signature / credential is intended to 
hide the identities of doctors and patients (anonymous), because of the 
players involved in e-health system  only allowed to know certain 
information that used when access to the system and not a players's privacy 
information. Thus, researchers hope will open up the eyes, giving insight, 
and make a commitment to the security of e-health system in Indonesia so it 
will increased the trust of the public. 
 
Methods 
Anonymous Credential System 
 The Players in anonymous credential system are issuer, user, prover 
and verifier. The players have a role in running the issuing protocol, where a 
credential created by the issuer and given to the user. On the proving 
protocol, user creates a proof  to convince the verifier that he is a valid user. 
A company can act as a verifier and run proof protocol with the user. A user 
chooses a master secret key (𝑚1) based on parameters group from the 
system, 𝑚1 also used to get a pseudonym that will be used as a session 
identifier in the communication process. To fulfill the anonymity, the user 
creates a new pseudonym whenever there is communication, so each 
communication session can not be linked (unlinkability) (Kellermann and 
Scholz, 2010). 
 Credential  issuance protocol is a protocol that is run by the issuer 
and the recipient (Bangerter et al.,2004) . The credential contains a set of 
attributes that are used to create a proof of possession  as proof of ownership 
attributes. Fig. 1 provides an illustration of the anonymous credential system. 
This system basically consists of a user and organization. Organizations can 
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act as verifier or credential issuers (Sudarsono et al, 2010). Organization  
have the possibility to act as issuer and verifier in one transaction, for 
example when issuing a credential and verify the credential upon another. 
The user has a role using the pseudonym and obtain a credential from the 
issuer, and then show the credential to another organization for verification 
(Sudarsono et al., 2011). Even all the organizations work together, they are 
not able to link a pseudonym that was verified by any organization and 
issued by any organization. And there is the possibility to show the 
credential as many times to the same organization, without knowing the user 
(Yang et al., 2009). 
 
Figure 1. Credential issuance protocol 
 
 CL (Camenisch-Lysyanskaya ) Signature-Scheme 
 We recall this signature scheme (the CL signature scheme) and the 
related protocols here (Kellermann and Scholz, 2010). 
 Key generation. On input 𝑙𝑛, choose an 𝑙𝑛 bit RSA modulus n such 
that 𝑛 ← 𝑝𝑞,𝑝 ← 2𝑝′ + 1, 𝑞 ← 2𝑞′ + 1 where 𝑝, 𝑞,𝑝′ and 𝑞′ are primes. 
Choose, uniformly at random, 𝑅0, … ,𝑅𝐿−1,𝑆,𝑍 ∈ 𝑄𝑅𝑛. Output the public 
key (𝑛,𝑅0, … ,𝑅𝐿−1, 𝑆,𝑍) and the secret key . 
 Message space. Let 𝑙𝑚 be a parameter. The message space is the set 
               {(𝑚0, … ,𝑚𝐿−1):𝑚𝑖 ∈ ±{0,1}𝑙𝑚}                                     (2) 
 Signing Algorithm. On input 𝑚0, … ,𝑚𝐿−1, choose a random prime  
number 𝑒 of length 𝑙𝑒 > 𝑙𝑚 + 2, and a random number 𝑣 of length 𝑙𝑣 ← 𝑙𝑛 +
𝑙𝑚 + 𝑙𝑟, where 𝑙𝑟 is a security parameter. Compute the value A such that                  𝐴 ← � 𝑍
𝑅0
𝑚0…..𝑅𝐿−1𝑚𝐿−1𝑆𝑣�1/𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛                       (3) 
 The signature on the message (𝑚0, … ,𝑚𝐿−1) consists of (𝐴, 𝑒, 𝑣). 
 Verification Algorithm. To verify that the tuple (𝐴, 𝑒, 𝑣) is a 
signature on message (𝑚0, … ,𝑚𝐿−1), check that 
                     𝑍 ≡  𝐴𝑒𝑅0𝑚0 …𝑅𝐿−1𝑚𝐿−1𝑆𝑣(𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛)                       (4) 
where 𝑚𝑖 ∈ ±{0,1}𝑙𝑚, and 2𝑙𝑒 > 𝑒 > 2𝑙𝑒−1 all holds. 
 
Secure E-health System Design 
 In this research, we designed a scenario for  the case of e-health,  that 
is  focused on the creation of e-id, and  interaction between  patient and 
doctor. 
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 Privacy  Requirements 
 Doctors  in many cases knowing the identity of his patients, however  
in certain cases the patient  will choose which pieces of information that 
should not be known by doctors. Doctors  should always get permission to 
access patient's health record.  
 Security Requirements 
 Some security requirements of secure e-health system are listed as 
follows. 
 Authentication. all players involved in e-health systems in each 
transaction must be able to pass the authentication process. It's mean  that 
they must be able to convince the other players that they  are valid players . 
 Data Integrity. recipes, health data center server, invoices, and other 
data must be valid in order to prevent interference. All players involved in 
the system  must be able to be checked for integrity.  
 Confidentiality. all data / items involved in each transaction should 
be guaranteed confidentiality. 
Players 
 User act as patient 
 Doctor 
 Hospital 
The role of each player 
 Patient:  requiring care / treatment or medical consultation. 
 Doctor:  requires access to all the patient's health history data. 
 Hospital: issue credential / signature 
issuing of e-id 
 At the Registration process in the hospital, patient  will enter privacy 
data  such as name, address,  place / date of birth etc. The hospital will 
process that data and send it to the e-health system to obtain the signature / 
credentials as seen in Fig. 2. The Signature that has been obtained, then 
inserted on  RFID card and called as e-id. 
Figure 2. Issuing of e-id 
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Consulting a Doctor 
 Patient visit a doctor to get medical help. The patient identifies 
himself to the doctor by using  e-ID. Doctor also prove his qualification by 
using e-ID. Patient have the authority with  e-ID to allow doctor accessing 
his medical record. The doctor checks the patient's health, adding new 
information to  the patient's health history data, and then providing medical 
recipes to patients and provide a bill of payment that can  be reimbursed by 
the patient's health insurance company. The detail Flow Interaction between 
patient and doctor is shown in Fig. 3 
 
Figure  3. Flow interaction between patient and doctor 
 
Experimental Result 
 In this research, the anonymous system and e-id will be tested by 
using PC with as shown in Table 1, and RFID reader with specifications as 
shown in Table 2. 
  
European Scientific Journal   September  2014 edition vol.10, No.27   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
100 
Table 1. Specifications of PC used in experiment 
Specification of Remarks 
Software java 
O/S Windows 8 (64 bit) 
CPU Intel Core™ i5-3317U Processor (1.70 GHz) 
RAM 4 GB 
 
Table 2. Specifications of RFID reader used in experiment 
Specification of Remarks 
Type EM9918 
Frequency 125 KHz 
Card format 
EM4100, 
GK4001/4011,T5557(EM 
format) 
Baud Rate 9600 
Interface Serial UART RS232 
Supply 9-12 V DC 
 
 E-id system created as an patient's and doctor's identity card , so they 
can  access  e-health system without reveal their personal identity. Several 
test that performed on the e-id system are anonymous credential system 
performance, security of personal data and integration of e-health systems 
with e-id.  
a.  Anonymous Credential System Performance 
 In this section, we discuss about the performance of an anonymous 
credential system, where the testing include execution time of key 
generation, issuing credentials and credential proving. 
Table 3. Execution time of public key generation 
No Execution Time (s) 
ln=1024, lpt=72 ln=2048, lpt=104 
1 2 5 
2 2 10 
3 3 12 
4 2 7 
5 2 16 
6 2 12 
7 3 15 
8 2 16 
9 2 16 
10 2 5 
average 2.2 11.4 
 
Experimental results   in Table 3 and  4 showed that  the public key 
generation requires a longer time, because the number of public key's 
components / elements are more than  private key's components. The 
increase in bit RSA modulus (ln) and the generation of primes (lpt) effect on 
European Scientific Journal   September  2014 edition vol.10, No.27   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
 
101 
execution time required, where the processing  time of public-key increased 
more than private key that is equal to 9.2 s. 
Table 4. Execution time of secret key generation 
No Execution Time (s) 
ln=1024, lpt=72 ln=2048, lpt=104 
1 2 4 
2 2 10 
3 2 11 
4 1 9 
5 2 10 
6 2 11 
7 3 12 
8 2 8 
9 2 9 
10 2 10 
average 2 9.4 
 
Table 5. Anonymous credential process performance 
No Process Time(s) 
1 
Generating key 
Secret Key 
Public Key 
4.2 
2 
2.2 
2 Issuing credential/signature 0.2 
3 Proving credential/signature 0.5 
 
 Table 5 show the results of measurements  for all processes on the 
anonymous credential system. Key generation process need the longest time 
4.2 seconds,it happen because there is  generation of RSA modulus. Issuing 
credential that consists of multiple processes which include the generation 
and verification of  CL signatures need the fastest time. Signature  generation 
is done by the signer and verification by the verifier. For authentication, 
prover requires more time than verifier. Because in the CL scheme, the proof 
of knowledge is a combination of a CL signature with the proof that a 
committed value included in the CL signature.      
b. Security of Personal Data 
 At the time of the registration process, the patient asked to enter 
personal data such as name, address, place / date of birth and several other 
private data. The registration process will generate cryptographic personal 
data that known as credential/signature. Fig. 5 shows an example of 
credential / signature that will be inserted into smart card (e-ID). E-id which 
has been accepted by the patient, will be used in the authentication process 
for a variety of cases including the opening of patient's medical record and  
and payment of consultation fee . 
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Figure 5. Example of credential/signature 
 
 Fig. 6 show the authentication process between patient and doctor  at 
the time of the examination and  opening the patient's medical record.  There 
must be approval from the patient by using e-id to open a patient's medical 
record at the time of consultation, and the doctor must shows their 
qualifications. If the  signature of patient and doctor accepted, then the 
doctor can read and update patient's medical record. It shows that, the system  
that made has been protect the personal data of the patient because there is 
no display personal information such as name, address on the patient's 
medical record. In addition, doctor also can not open the patient's medical 
record if the patient does not give permission. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Authentication process between patient and doctor 
 
At the time of  payment process, patients do not need to carry a 
consultation card, payment processing is done by performing authentication 
using  e-id so the cashier does not need to know the data of patients and 
doctors. 
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c. Integration of E-Health System with E-id 
 In this experimental test, authentication process was calculated from 
the e-id  until  accepted by the e-health system. Table 6 showed that the 
execution time  of authentication process by using e-id is 0.63 s, and table 7 
showed that various distance of the tag at the  time of the authentication 
process does not significantly affect execution time ,  where the average time 
of the process  is 0.6 s. 
Table 6.  Execution time of authentication process  using e-id 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 Table 7.  Execution time  of authentication  process  from  various distances tags 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 In this research, we present privacy protection systems of client on  
consulting services to doctor based e-id using an anonymous credential 
system, where experimental results showed that the system that made  has 
been protecting the personal data of patients. The experimental results also 
showed that authentication process by using e-id need execution time around 
0.6 s, whereas testing with different tags position do not influenced 
significantly to the time that required for authentication process. 
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